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ABSTRACT 12 
By setting the regulatory-approved protocol for a suite of first-in-human studies on BIA 10-13 
2474 against the subsequent French investigations, we highlight six key design and statistical 14 
issues which reinforce recommendations by a Royal Statistical Society Working Party which 15 
were made in the aftermath of cytokine release storm in six healthy volunteers in the UK in 16 
2006.  17 
 18 
The six issues are: dose determination; availability of pharmacokinetic results; dosing 19 
interval; stopping rules; appraisal by safety committee; clear algorithm required if combining 20 
approvals for single and multiple ascending dose studies. 21 
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Background 27 
Cytokine release storm in six healthy volunteers in 2006: In the United Kingdom (UK), Te 28 
Genero’s highly novel monoclonal antibody TGN1412 caused a cytokine release storm in all 29 
6 healthy male volunteers who received it in an initial first-in-human (FIH) cohort of eight 30 
subjects, two of whom were randomized to placebo [1]. Cytokine release storm was an 31 
anticipated serious adverse event but the chance of its occurrence was presumed low.   A 32 
 2 
 
contract research organization, Parexel, had conducted the TGN1412 study on behalf of 33 
Germany’s Te Genero. The UK regulator and ethics committee had permitted an inter-34 
administration interval of only 10 minutes between subjects.   35 
The Royal Statistical Society’s (RSS) Working Party on Statistical Issues in First-in-Man 36 
Studies therefore recommended the justification always of a proper inter-administration 37 
interval between successive subjects, and also specification of the waiting time for 38 
laboratory-based results which pertained to subjects’  ‘safety’[2], see  BOX 1.   As we shall 39 
see, both issues recurred in the suite of FIH studies in France on BIA 10-2474, an inhibitor of 40 
fatty acid amide hydrolase (FAAH).  41 
The Duff report on TGN1412[3] led to a revised European guideline on strategies to identify 42 
and mitigate risks for FIH trials[4], but its provisions on inter-administration intervals had 43 
been weakened through consultation[5]. The European Medicines Agency is consulting until 44 
February 2017 on its November 2016 revision[6] which, although substantially improved, 45 
remains insufficiently strict in section 8.2 on precautions to apply between treating subjects 46 
within a cohort, see below; and between cohorts, see BOX 2. 47 
Fatality and four other serious-adverse-event hospitalizations in healthy volunteers in 2016: 48 
France’s Agence Nationale de Securite du Medicament et des Produits de Santé (ANSM) 49 
gave approval on 26 June 2015 for a contract research organization, Biotrial, to conduct a 50 
suite of healthy volunteer FIH studies in Rennes on the Portuguese firm BIAL’s FAAH-51 
inhibitor, BIA 10-2474[7].   52 
Seven single ascending dose (SAD) escalations (6 of them doublings from 1.25 mg to 40 mg; 53 
then 100 mg) were followed by a shift to multiple ascending doses (MAD), the details of  54 
which were unspecified in the protocol but entailed once-daily administration for 10 days. 55 
Two subjects (one actively treated, one placebo) in only the initial lowest-dose SAD cohort 56 
(0.25 mg) were administered their assigned medication 24 hours ahead of the remaining six 57 
volunteers in the SAD-1 cohort (five actively treated, one placebo). Subsequent SAD and 58 
MAD cohorts of eight subjects (six actively treated, two placebo) lacked even a single 59 
sentinel-pair, see BOX 3. 60 
Tragically, on 10 January 2016, the fifth day of daily dosing at 50 mg in the MAD-5 cohort, 61 
BIA 10-2474 caused the sudden onset of symptoms (including blurred vision and severe 62 
headache; also slurred speech and ataxia, as recently revealed [8]) and, by evening, 63 
hospitalization of a healthy male volunteer who became comatose by late morning on 11 64 
January and died on 17 January 2016[7]. Notwithstanding his hospitalization (and clinical 65 
symptoms in a second volunteer on Day 5[8]), the remainder of the MAD-5 cohort received 66 
their sixth dose at around 8 o’clock in the morning of 11 January. Of the five who were 67 
actively treated on Day 6, two developed neurological symptoms and were hospitalized that 68 
day, two more on 12 January, with the fifth hospitalized on 13 January as a precaution.  69 
 70 
  71 
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Chronology, disclosures and investigations in France 72 
Biotrial/BIAL suspended the MAD-5 cohort on 11 January 2016 after the condition of the 73 
first hospitalized volunteer worsened and symptom onset in two others; ANSM was informed 74 
on 14 January; the Biotrial protocol[9] was published on 22 January 2016, after Le Figaro had 75 
leaked it[10]; preliminary and final reports by Inspection Generale des Affaires Sociales 76 
(IGAS) were made on 4 February and 23 May[7 11 12]; and by France’s Temporary Specialist 77 
Scientific Committee (TSSC) on 7 March and 19 April[13]. The TSSC had access to the 78 
Investigator Brochure (IB) which describes dose-related adverse events in four animal 79 
species[13]. The IB has also been leaked but, even 11 months after the fatality on 17 January 80 
2016, BIAL has failed to publish the IB despite repeated calls for its publication [7 14-16]. The 81 
French press [17-20] has made important disclosures at the behest of volunteers and in defence 82 
of Biotrial’s duty-doctor, some of which conflict with the investigatory accounts. 83 
The TSSC strongly suspected that an off-target effect of BIA 10-2474 was responsible [13]. If 84 
BIA 10-2474’s mode of action was solely FAAH-inhibition, TSSC questioned the exposure 85 
of healthy volunteers to doses higher than 5 mg, as FAAH inhibition had already occurred 86 
although extrapolation from pre-clinical studies had suggested 10-40mg could be needed for 87 
FAAH-inhibition. Pharmacodynamic (PD) analyses showing 100% FAAH inhibition by 5mg 88 
should have been available to inform dose escalation decisions in subsequent SAD cohorts, 89 
let alone in MAD cohorts [16]. The testing of very high non-pharmacological doses to 90 
establish a Maximum Tolerated Dose is ill-advised in healthy volunteers [6]. 91 
The TSSC noted steepness in the dose-escalation curve and apparent lengthening of the half-92 
life so that dose-escalation should have been moderated and informed by the preceding 93 
cohort’s PK results, see BOX 3. The TSSC also cautioned that individual variation in 94 
pharmacokinetic (PK) parameters, not just means, matters: see “Bayesian methods in 95 
pharmaceutical practice” [21]. 96 
Lacking from the investigatory accounts:  As statisticians, we had expected critical 97 
examination of  the ANSM-approved BIAL/Biotrial protocol including comparison of what 98 
was written in the protocol with what was done; an audit-trail of dates for the receipt at 99 
BIAL/Biotrial of each cohort’s analysed PK and/or PD results; clear documentation of the 100 
data (PK and/or PD, adverse events, external) that were appraised by the BIAL/Biotrial safety 101 
committee at each dose-escalation decision – especially the decision to administer  50 mg 102 
daily for 10 days when the approved protocol had made no explicit mention of a 50 mg dose; 103 
and an unambiguous account (by assigned treatment, volunteer code, and ideally with 104 
consent) of the adverse events experienced. In extremis in FIH studies, as here, medical 105 
confidentiality should be balanced by the wider public good, as some volunteers and families 106 
have demonstrated. 107 
 108 
  109 
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Focus on key statistical issues 110 
By setting the ANSM-approved protocol against the subsequent investigations, we highlight 111 
six key design and statistical issues which reinforce recommendations by the RSS working 112 
party, see BOX 1. The six issues are: dose determination; availability of PK results; dosing 113 
interval; stopping rules; appraisal by safety committee; clear algorithm if combining 114 
SAD/MAD approvals. 115 
Dose determination – rationale and in practice: No dose was pre-specified in the ANSM-116 
approved protocol for any MAD cohort: if the maximum tolerated dose was not reached after 117 
completing MAD-4, ANSM permitted that up to four additional MAD cohorts could be 118 
added. The Ethics Committee, which gave approval on 3 July 2015, had queried what 119 
information would be given to MAD volunteers about the scheme for determining which 120 
doses to administer. Re-assurance was given to the Ethics Committee that volunteers would 121 
be told the assigned dose [7], but this is not the same as explaining the rationale for how that 122 
dose was determined.  123 
On 24 April 2016, De Pracontal reported that volunteer 2508 (who subsequently died) had 124 
recounted to his partner that the team at Biotrial had decided to increase the administered 125 
dose in MAD-5 from 40 mg to 50 mg “because they had estimated that there would not be 126 
enough of effects at 40 mg” [18]. For this dose-escalation in particular, investigatory reports 127 
should have clearly specified: i) the PK (and, see BOX 2, PD [6]) analyses from previous 128 
SAD and MAD cohorts that were actually considered by the safety committee, ii) the adverse 129 
events from previous SAD and MAD cohorts that were appraised by the safety committee, 130 
iii) pertinent other information considered and iv) the written final rationale by which the 131 
safety committee authorized escalation from 20 mg daily for 10 days in MAD-4  to 50 mg 132 
daily for 10 days in the MAD-5 cohort.  133 
Safety precautions – PK results, per-protocol versus in practice:  The ANSM-approved 134 
protocol had clearly stated that the dose levels for the first 4 MAD cohorts would be 135 
determined: “after evaluation of the safety, tolerability and available pharmacokinetic (PK) 136 
results of previous SAD and MAD (when applicable) dose groups.”  As the interval between 137 
SAD and MAD cohorts was 7 to 14 days except for the SAD-2 cohort (31 days) and MAD-5 138 
cohort (18 days), Eddleston et al.[22] concluded: “Except for the second cohort, the delay 139 
between cohorts did not allow the previous cohort’s pharmacokinetics to be considered 140 
before starting another, something recommended in the RSS report”. The planned last study 141 
in the FIH suite of four was for PD analyses. 142 
Collection schedules (for blood and urine samples) and a data analysis plan were set out. But 143 
there was no schedule for Biotrial’s receipt of PK results. And despite calling for a debate on 144 
open data from FIH studies [13], the TSSC did not disclose the actual PK results from SAD-145 
cohorts at 20 mg, 40 mg and 100 mg; nor from MAD-cohorts at 10 mg and 20 mg; nor 146 
precisely when the latter results were received at Biotrial7 for review by its safety committee 147 
as, per-protocol for the MAD cohorts (see BOX 3: PRECAUTION), they should have been 148 
before determining that MAD cohort-5 would receive 50 mg daily for 10 days. 149 
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Divergence from what was written in the protocol for MAD versus SAD cohorts (see BOX 3) 150 
was not highlighted when the TSSC reported that, in practice, from the MAD-3 cohort (10 151 
mg), administration to MAD-n cohort was based on the PK information from the MAD-(n-2) 152 
cohort. For the MAD-5 cohort (50 mg), this delay was 40 days but, as Eddleston et al. [22] 153 
have pointed out, the delay was only 18 days between the end-date of the MAD-4 (20 mg) 154 
and initiation of MAD- 5: too short for the PK information from the MAD-4 cohort to have 155 
been taken into account [2 3].  156 
Safety precautions – dosing interval  and escalation stopping rules, per-protocol versus in 157 
practice:  The protocol stated that, if there were drug safety concerns for MAD-cohorts, the 158 
subjects’ dosing would be staggered (a maximum of 4 subjects dosed on the same day and 24 159 
hours of follow-up necessary before dosing the remaining subjects). This did not happen and 160 
so we may infer that the safety committee had no such concerns. 161 
Stopping rules for safety, given as a guideline only in the protocol, stated that the dose should 162 
not be escalated further if one of four circumstances occurred in subjects within the same 163 
cohort (our italics), unless it was obvious that the occurrence was not related to the 164 
administration of the treatment.  First of these four circumstances was: drug-related severe 165 
adverse event of the same character in 4 or more subjects. The other three (laboratory 166 
abnormalities; changes in vital signs; confirmed changes in ECG) required clinically 167 
significant drug-related occurrence in 6 or more subjects – despite each cohort having only 6 168 
actively treated subjects. 169 
Biotrial claimed that its FIH designs were in line with current regulatory guidance. If so, 170 
stopping rules for safety in FIH studies need to be reviewed since the approved protocol 171 
permitted drug-related severe adverse events to be observed in half the healthy volunteers 172 
without necessitating a stay on dose-escalation. By contrast, several published designs use 173 
dose-response models to curb the adoption of dangerously high doses by predicting safety 174 
outcomes for future cohorts [23-25]. 175 
Appraisal by safety committee– per-protocol versus in practice: As is required in Phase I 176 
studies, dose-escalation in the MAD stage was also conditional on the absence of toxic 177 
effects in volunteers at the preceding dose-level upon appraisal by an advisory committee. 178 
Unlike in Phase II/III studies, there is no requirement for independent membership of Phase 1 179 
safety committees. The BIAL/Biotrial advisory committee judged that double-vision, later 180 
described by TSSC as blurred vision [13] (compare page 18 in second report versus page 10 in 181 
first), on two separate occasions in each of two volunteers in MAD-3 (10 mg) was unrelated 182 
to the study drug and so permitted MAD-4 (20 mg) to proceed.   183 
In combination, a lack of transparent audit by BIAL/Biotrial and inconsistent documentation 184 
by TSSC about adverse events necessitated recourse to newspaper reports.  In May 2016, Le 185 
Figaro reported that magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) in 2016 for volunteers in the suite of 186 
BIA 10-2474 FIH studies had revealed that an actively-treated volunteer 2305, one of the two 187 
with visual disturbances in MAD-3 (10 mg), had had a cerebral vascular accident which may 188 
have occurred proximal to his participation in MAD-3.  Le Figaro, citing an unpublished 189 
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ANSM report, also claimed prolonged headache for one volunteer in each of MAD-cohorts 190 
10 mg or 20 mg, which TSSC classed as non-severe [13]. The neurological symptoms on 10 191 
January presented by the volunteer who subsequently died included double-vision and 192 
headache among others [8], as confirmed by Mediapart’s publication of correspondence by the 193 
duty-doctor at Biotrial who referred this volunteer to hospital. On referral, the duty-doctor 194 
asked whether the patient’s condition might be related to the study drug [20]. The IB was made 195 
available to the intensivists during their treatment of the hospitalized volunteers but how 196 
quickly remains to be established. 197 
To date, there is no properly-dated, consistent account of which PK evaluation reports were 198 
received when, and which of them - alongside which adverse-event reports – were considered 199 
by the BIAL/Biotrial safety committee prior to approving the next dose escalation. Press 200 
reporting of volunteers’ experience of adverse events (blurred vision or double-vision; 201 
duration; severity of headaches) can appear at odds with the investigatory-teams on what 202 
transpired in terms of the evolution of adverse events - including on the morning, afternoon 203 
and evening of 10 January 2016 [8] - which led to the hospitalization of a volunteer who had 204 
received five 50 mg daily doses of BIA 10-2474.  205 
Combined-approval of SAD and MAD stages needs clear algorithm: The suite of FIH studies 206 
on BIA 10-2474 combined SAD and MAD stages. Had the latter been independently 207 
presented for regulatory and ethical approval,  the SAD results would need to have been 208 
presented to justify the conduct of the MAD stage. By putting these two stages together,  the 209 
sponsor made such a review  impossible. It thus behoved the sponsor to make sure that a clear 210 
algorithm for proceeding to, and through, the MAD stage  - based on previous results -  was 211 
provided. 212 
 213 
Flexible trials[26], in which the information gained early on is used to modify subsequent 214 
conduct, have received much theoretical attention in recent years. Regulators do not permit 215 
their use in Phase II/III without explicit rules covering modfication and the provision of 216 
stringent safeguards. Similar safeguards ought to apply in Phase I. 217 
 218 
 219 
Discussion 220 
 221 
A common expectation in multiple dose studies is that, based on the available PK 222 
information,  the steady state concentration that a chosen regimen is expected to reach should 223 
not be higher than that already tested in single dose studies. Given that the highest SAD dose 224 
had been 100 mg, a 50 mg daily dose over 10 days would be hard to justify unless it were 225 
known that elimination of the drug was fairly rapid (say, linear with a half-life of at most one 226 
day). Instead, according to TSSC, BIA 10-2474 had a long half-life which extended with 227 
increased doses [13] but the actual PK results were not disclosed. 228 
 229 
To enable others to do better, it is important that information on the design and conduct of the 230 
BIAL/Biotrial trial, and its results, are shared widely. 231 
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Conclusions:  If there is high inter-volunteer variation in susceptibility to risk, a single 232 
sentinel-pair {active; placebo}, treated 24 hours ahead of other volunteers in the lowest dose 233 
FIH cohort only,  as in BIA 10-2474, will be generally insufficient: in some or all cohorts 234 
multiple sentinel-pairs, each at 24 hour (or longer) intervals, may be necessary. 235 
Implementation of the current [4] (and future draft [6]) European guideline on risk mitigation 236 
needs to be more thoughtful: both between volunteers within a cohort; and in determining 237 
dose-level per-cohort. Regulators should specifically assess how well safeguarding is 238 
justified per-cohort (eg reliance on single or multiple sentinel-pairs, each at 24 hour 239 
intervals); and should appraise the principles (eg on inhibition; maximum occupancy) and 240 
precautionary practice by which the dose-level per-cohort will be decided in the light of 241 
pharmacological effects at preceding dose-levels. Guidelines serve to assist, not abrogate, 242 
thoughtfulness. 243 
In the UK, clinical research organizations are registered by the regulator. European regulators 244 
should be able to de-register contract research organizations if the safety precautions that 245 
were written into approved protocols are weakened in practice. 246 
Regulators should be extremely wary of stopping rules for dose-escalation in FIH studies 247 
which require at least two-thirds of the actively-treated healthy volunteers to experience 248 
severe adverse events before stopping is invoked. The occurrence of possibly related events 249 
in preceding cohorts should be taken into consideration [2]. Consideration might be given to 250 
whether having a written charter [27], which sets out the independent membership, role and 251 
responsibilities of safety committees for FIH studies, would assist them. 252 
By offering staged approvals, regulators could enable pharmaceutical companies to invoke 253 
adaptive designs for FIH studies which use Bayesian methods formally to incorporate PK 254 
information from all preceding cohorts. Properly used, and with explicit assumptions, these 255 
designs hope to optimize both the number of subjects and the active: placebo ratio for the 256 
next cohort of healthy volunteers exposed to higher doses [2]. 257 
Latitude in approved protocols should never extend to wholly unspecified dose-levels [6]. A 258 
mechanism is needed for an approved protocol-variation if later dose levels are to be 259 
escalated exceptionally (for example, supra-pharmacologically) in the light of data from 260 
earlier cohorts; or for another reason.  261 
 262 
  263 
 8 
 
Conflicts of Interest: All authors were members of Royal Statistical Society’s Working 264 
Party on Statistical Issues in First-in-Man Studies, which SS chaired.  265 
SMB holds GSK shares. 266 
APG is a statistician working for a CRO providing services for pharmaceutical sponsors, is a 267 
past-chairperson of Statisticians in the Pharmaceutical Industry and a past-president of the 268 
Royal Statistical Society.  APG holds shares in ICON plc. 269 
SS holds shares in Novartis and regularly consults for the pharmaceutical industry. 270 
Funding:  SS’s work was funded by the European Union's FP7 programme grant number 271 
602552 for the IDEAL project. 272 
273 
 9 
 
References  274 
1. G. Sunthalingan, M.R. Perry, S. Ward, S.J. Brett, A. Castello-Cortes, M.D. Brunner, 275 
N. Panoskaltsis. Cytokine release storm in a phase 1 trial of anti-CD28 monoclonal 276 
antibody TGN1412. New England Journal of Medicine 2006, 355, 1018 –1028. 277 
2. S. Senn, D. Amin, R.A. Bailey, S.M. Bird, B. Bogacka, P. Colman, A. Garrett, A. 278 
Grieve, P. Lachmann. Statistical issues in first-in-man studies (Report of a Royal 279 
Statistical Society Working Party, chairman: Professor Stephen Senn).  Journal of the 280 
Royal Statistical Society Series A (Statistics in Society) 2007, 170, 517 – 579. 281 
3. Expert Scientific Group on Phase One Clinical Trials (Final report of a group 282 
convened by UK’s Medicines and Healthcare Regulatory Authority and chaired by 283 
Professor Sir Gordon Duff). Final report online 6 December 2006, see 284 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/dh.gov.uk/en/publicationsandstatistics/pu285 
blications/publicationspolicyandguidance/dh_063117 (accessed 16 March 2016). 286 
4. European Medicines Agency Committee for Medical Products for Human Use 287 
(CHMP).  Guideline on Strategies to Identify and Mitigate Risks for First-in-Human 288 
Clinical Trials with Investigational Medical Products, as finalized in 2009 (see page 289 
10 of 290 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2009/291 
09/WC500002988.pdf; last accessed 16 March 2016). 292 
5. European Medicines Agency Committee for Medical Products for Human Use 293 
(CHMP).  Guideline on Requirements for First-in-Man Clinical Trials for Potential 294 
High-Risk Medicinal Products. Draft for consultation in 2009 (see page 9, at 295 
http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2009/296 
09/WC500002989.pdf; last accessed 16 March 2016).  297 
6. European Medicines Agency Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use 298 
(CHMP). Guideline on strategies to identify and mitigate risks for first-in-human and 299 
early clinical trials with investigational medicinal products. 10 November 2016 draft: 300 
EMA/CHMP/SWP/28367/07 Rev. 1 301 
(http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/en_GB/document_library/Scientific_guideline/2016/302 
11/WC500216158.pdf. Last accessed 29 December 2016). 303 
7. L’Inspection Generale des Affaires Sociales (IGAS). Enquete sur des incidents graves 304 
survenus dans le cadre de la realisation d’un essai Clinique. Premieres Constatations 305 
(5 February 2016). See http://social-sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/fevrier_2016_-306 
_note_etape_-_accident_essai_clinique.pdf (accessed 16 March 2016). Final report in 307 
two volumes was published in French on 23 May 2016, see http://social-308 
sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/2016-012r_tome_1_rapport_definitif_rect_20_05.pdf [page  309 
28-30 re questions raised by Ethics Committee] and http://social-310 
sante.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/2016-311 
012r_tome_2_rapport_definitif_enquete_incident_grave_essai_clinique.pdf  (last 312 
accessed 4 July 2016). 313 
 10 
 
8. A. Kerbrat, J-C. Ferre, P. Fillatre, T. Ronziere, S. Vannier, B. Carsin-Nicol, S. 314 
Lavoue, M. Verin, J-Y. Gauvrit, Y. Le Tulzo, G. Edan. Acute neurologic disorder 315 
from an inhibitor of fatty acid amide hydrolase. New England Journal of Medicine 316 
2016, 375, 1717-1725. (doi: 10.1056/NEJMoa1604221). 317 
9. L’Agence Nationale de Securite du Medicament et des Produits de Sante (ANSM). 318 
For time-line and reports, see  http://ansm.sante.fr/Dossiers/Essai-Clinique-Bial-319 
Biotrial/Essai-clinique-BIA-102474-101-du-laboratoire-BIAL/%28offset%29/0.  320 
Including English version of Clinical Study Protocol No BIA 102474-101: A double-321 
blind, randomised, placebo-controlled combined single and multiple ascending dose 322 
study including food interaction, to investigate the safety, the tolerability, 323 
pharmacokinetic and pharmacodynamic profile of BIA 10-2474, in healthy  324 
volunteers. See 325 
http://ansm.sante.fr/var/ansm_site/storage/original/application/3968769c8773917a7eb326 
56202e18a6ae4.pdf. Also ansm.sante.fr/.../protocole_BIAL_102474+101-327 
22012016131259.pdf, accessed 16 March 2016. 328 
10. N. Hawkes. Details of French drug trial must be released urgently, say UK experts. 329 
British Medical Journal 2016, 352, i319. 330 
11. N. Hawkes. French drug trial had three major failings, says initial report. British 331 
Medical Journal 2016, 352, i784. 332 
12. B. Casassus. France releases interim report on drug trial disaster. Lancet 2016, 387, 333 
634-635. 334 
13. Temporary Specialist Scientific Committee (TSSC). Minutes of TSSC meeting on 335 
“FAAH (Fatty Acid Amide Hydrolase) Inhibitors” on 15 February 2016 (released on 336 
7 March 2016; English version on 8 March 2016). See 337 
http://ansm.sante.fr/Dossiers/Essai-Clinique-Bial-Biotrial/Essai-clinique-BIA-338 
102474-101-du-laboratoire-BIAL/%28offset%29/0; accessed  9 March 2016. TSSC 339 
published its second report on 19 April 2016, the English translation of which was 340 
released on 24 April 2016, see 341 
http://ansm.sante.fr/content/download/88057/1108293/version/1/file/CSST_FAAH_R342 
apport-Final_Version-Anglaise_18-04-2016.pdf; last accessed on 4 July 2016. 343 
14. Royal Statistical Society. Royal Statistical Society Statement on the publication of 344 
study protocol BIA-102474-101 for the French  “first-in-man” trial in healthy 345 
volunteers. See http://www.rss.org.uk/Images/PDF/about/press-releases/2016-01-22-346 
rss-statment-BIA-102474-101-french-first-trial-in-healthy-volunteers.pdf (last 347 
accessed 20 March 2016). 348 
15. S. Alexander, A. Cohen, M. Pirmohamed, D. Webb. Improve early access to data 349 
from catastrophic clinical trials: a statement on behalf of the British Pharmacological 350 
Society, 22 January 2016. See https://www.bps.ac.uk/news-events/news/society-351 
news/articles/improve-early-access-to-data-from-catastrophic-cli (accessed 20 March 352 
2016). 353 
16. J. Randerson. Fatal French clinical trial failed to check data before raising drug dose. 354 
Revelation from drug firm Bial prompts criticism from pharmacologists. Nature 2016, 355 
 11 
 
22 December, News. (http://www.nature.com/news/fatal-french-clinical-trial-failed-356 
to-check-data-before-raising-drug-dose-1.21190; last accessed 29 December 2016). 357 
17. A. Jouant,  D. Mascret. Essai Clinique: le document qui accable Biotrial et L’ANSM. 358 
Le Figaro 2016, 13 April. See http://sante.lefigaro.fr/actualite/2016/04/13/24857-359 
essai-clinique-document-qui-accable-biotrial-lansm. (accessed 20 April 2016). 360 
18. M. De Pracontal. Essai de Rennes: comment Biotrial s'est moqué de l'Igas. Mediapart 361 
2106, 24 April. 362 
19. A. Jouant. Essai clinique de Rennes : quand le CHU réécrit les comptes rendus 363 
d’IRM. L’hôpital confirme l’information du « Figaro » selon laquelle un des 364 
volontaires a eu un AVC lors de la période de l’essai. Le Figaro 2016, 2 June,12. (See 365 
also:  sante.lefigaro.fr/actualite/2016/05/12/24963-essai-clinique-rennes-novembre-366 
volontaire-avait-deja-eu-avc ; last accessed on 4 July 2016). 367 
20. M. De Pracontal. Essai clinique mortel de Rennes: la lettre qui trahit le laboratoire 368 
Biotrial. Mediapart 2016, 1 June.  369 
21. A. Racine, A.P. Grieve, H. Flühler, A.F.M. Smith. Bayesian Methods in Practice: 370 
Experiences in the Pharmaceutical Industry (with Discussion). Applied Statistics 371 
1986, 35, 93-150. 372 
22. M. Eddleston, A.F. Cohen, D.J. Webb. Implications of the BIA-102474-101 study for 373 
review of first-into-human clinical trials (Editorial). British Journal of Clinical 374 
Pharmacology 2016, 81, 582-586. 375 
23. J. Babb, A. Rogatko, S. Zacks. Cancer phase I clinical trials: efficient dose escalation 376 
with overdose control. Statistics in Medicine 1998, 17, 1103 - 1120. 377 
24. B. Neuenschwander, M. Branson, T. Gsponer. Critical aspects of the Bayesian 378 
approach to phase I cancer trials. Statistics in Medicine 2008, 27, 2420 - 2439. 379 
25. J. Whitehead, S. Patterson, D. Webber, S. Francis, Y. Zhou. Easy-to-implement 380 
Bayesian methods for dose-escalation studies in healthy volunteers. Biostatistics 381 
2001, 2, 47-61. 382 
26. Food and Drugs Administration. Draft Guidance for Industry: Adaptive Design 383 
Clinical Trials for Drugs and Biologics. February 2010. See 384 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/.../Guidances/ucm201790.pdf; last accessed 4 385 
July 2016. 386 
27. DAMOCLES Study Group. A proposed charter for clinical trial data monitoring 387 
committees: helping them to do their job well. Lancet 2005, 365, 711 – 722. 388 
 389 
 390 
 391 
  392 
 12 
 
BOX 1: Royal Statistical Society’s Working Party on Statistical Issues in First-in-Man 393 
Studies [2] made 21 recommendations, of which we list 11 below. 394 
R4. Before proceeding to a first-in-man study, there should be: 395 
(a)  quantitative justification of the starting dose—based on suitable preclinical studies and 396 
relevant calculations; 397 
(b)  a priori assessment of the risk level for the recommended study dose(s); 398 
(c) appraisal of the uncertainty about these recommendations. 399 
R9. Unless arguments have been provided that the risk is so low that simultaneous treatments 400 
are acceptable, in order to allow early evidence of toxicity to halt the trial without risk to 401 
subsequent subjects, a proper, or sufficient, inter-administration interval needs to be proposed 402 
and observed. 403 
R10. First-in-man study protocols should provide: 404 
(a) justification of the proper interval between administration to successive subjects; 405 
(b) justification of the dose steps the trial will use; 406 
(c) operational definition of ‘safety’ if investigating safety and tolerability; 407 
(d) delay between receiving biomarker or other laboratory results which determine ‘safety’ 408 
and having obtained the relevant biological sample; 409 
(e) prior estimates of the expected number (or rate) of adverse reactions by dose, especially 410 
those serious enough to raise questions about ‘safety’. 411 
R11. Appropriate sample sizes for first-in-man studies can be better justified statistically—412 
rather than by mere custom and practice—when ‘safety’ has been given an operational 413 
definition. 414 
R12. First-in-man study protocols should discuss their chosen design and its limitations 415 
together with the implications for analysis. For example, if an unequal allocation between 416 
treatment and placebo per dose step is chosen, this affects the ability of the data safety 417 
monitors to assess tolerability most efficiently before proceeding to a further dose escalation 418 
step.  419 
R13. First-in-man study protocols should describe their intended analysis in sufficient detail 420 
to allow protocol reviewers (and the independent research ethics committee) to determine 421 
whether the objectives, design and proposed analyses are compatible.  422 
R14.The design of first-in-man trials and the analysis of the data should reflect realistic 423 
models of the pharmacokinetic data.  424 
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R16. For first-in-man studies, the standard of informed consent to be observed is ‘open 425 
protocol, hidden allocation’—i.e. all aspects of the trial design shall be shared with subjects 426 
to be recruited.  427 
R17. Public debate and research are needed about the maximum acceptable level of risk for 428 
first-in-man studies in healthy volunteers, and about whether there should be risk-adjusted 429 
remuneration of healthy volunteers.  430 
R18. Competent drug regulatory authorities should provide a mechanism for the 431 
pharmaceutical industry to collect and share data on serious adverse reactions in first-in-man 432 
studies—to improve a priori risk assessment.  433 
(a)  For example, separate syntheses of study designs and of the occurrences of predicted, 434 
theoretical and unprecedented harms—either as serious adverse events or distributional 435 
changes in biomarkers—should be considered for healthy volunteers and for patients, by type 436 
and novelty of compound, and by a priori assessed level of risk. 437 
(b)  In particular, for the UK, the MHRA should report annually on the designs of, and 438 
serious adverse events (whether for the first exposed cohort or at a dose escalation step) in, 439 
first-in-man studies in healthy volunteers (versus patients) that involved administration of a 440 
biological or biotechnology, and for those that involved a chemical compound.  441 
(c)  The MHRA should also take responsibility for maintaining a central registry of 442 
participating volunteers in the UK. 443 
R19. Statistical reporting of preclinical studies should be improved to be comparable with the 444 
requirements by the International Conference on Harmonisation for the reporting of clinical 445 
trials.  446 
 447 
 448 
 449 
 450 
  451 
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BOX 2: European guidelines on strategies to identify and mitigate risks for First-in-452 
Human trials. 453 
2.1 Draft for consultation [5], page 9 (our italics):  454 
“For trials with high-risk medicinal products, an initial sequential dose administration design 455 
should be employed within each cohort in order to minimise any risks. Any non-sequential 456 
dose administration within each cohort should be justified . . . “ 457 
2.2 As finalized in 2009[4], page 10 (our italics):  458 
“It will usually be appropriate to design the administration of the first dose so that a single 459 
subject receives a single dose of the active IMP. Further dose administration should be 460 
sequential within each cohort to mitigate the risk. Any non-sequential dose administration 461 
within each cohort should be justified . . .” 462 
2.3.1 European Medicines Agency November 2016 draft Guideline on strategies to identify 463 
and mitigate risks for first-in-human and early clinical trials with investigational medicinal 464 
products (IMPs) [6], section 8.2.6 on Precautions to apply between treating subjects within a 465 
cohort (our italics):  466 
“It is considered appropriate to design the administration of the first dose in any cohort so 467 
that a single subject receives a single dose of the active IMP. When the study design 468 
includes the use of placebo it would be appropriate to allow for one subject on active and one 469 
on placebo to be dosed simultaneously prior to dosing the remaining subjects in the cohort. 470 
There should be an adequate period of time between the administration of treatment to these 471 
first subjects in a cohort and the remaining subjects in the cohort to observe any reactions and 472 
adverse events. The duration of the interval of observation should be justified and will 473 
depend on the properties of the IMP and the interpretation of the available data, including 474 
non-clinical PK and PD. Experience and . . . “ 475 
2.3.2 European Medicines Agency November 2016 draft Guideline on strategies to identify 476 
and mitigate risks for first-in-human and early clinical trials with investigational medicinal 477 
products (IMPs) [6], section 8.2.7 on Precautions to apply between cohorts (our italics): 478 
“Administration in the next cohort should not occur before participants in the previous cohort 479 
have been treated and PK data, where available, or possible adverse events from those 480 
participants are reviewed in accordance with the protocol. Thus all relevant data from cohort 481 
“n” should be reviewed prior to allowing dosing of cohort “n+1”. Review of all previous 482 
cohorts’ data in a cumulative manner is preferred. Late emerging safety issues that may 483 
have occurred after the time-point for the dose escalation decision (for example, 48 hour 484 
safety data for each subject set as the minimum data required but significant event(s) 485 
happening at 7 days post dose) can then be considered. 486 
All emerging PD, PK and safety data should be critically reviewed against the pre-defined 487 
stopping criteria (see section 8.2.10), including exposure limits that are not to be exceeded. 488 
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Account should be taken of any signs related to potential PD or toxicity targets identified in 489 
non-clinical studies. While there can be no delay for safety data, a lack of PD information or 490 
a reduced PK data set could be justifiable in some cases, such as a short duration of the PD 491 
effect. 492 
The review should include comparison of PK, PD or PK/PD data from any previous 493 
cohorts with known non-clinical data and safety information to inform the decision, as 494 
well as . . . “  495 
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BOX 3: Suite of four First-in-Human studies on BIA 10-2474 approved by France’s 496 
Agence Nationale de Securite du Medicaments et des Produits de Sante (ANSM). 497 
Phase  and 
Cohort 
Design 
{randomly assigned; 
with between-subject 
interval of 10-minutes} 
Dose Neurological Adverse 
Events: according to 
investigatory reports, press 
or volunteer accounts 
Single Ascending Dose (SAD) Cohorts: 8 SAD cohorts, & approval for 4 more . . .  
Pharmacokinetic (PK) PRECAUTION: PK results for SAD cohort (n-2) must be 
available for review before the start of SAD cohort n [9]. 
SAD- 1 
Begun on 9th 
July 2015 
{1 active; 1 placebo} 
24-hours’ delay, then 
{5 active; 1 placebo} 
  0.25 mg, 1/400th 
no-observed-
adverse-effect-
level (NOAEL) in 
rats 
 
 
 
 
 
None reported as far as 
we know 
SAD- 2 {6 active; 2 placebo}    1.25 mg 
SAD- 3 {6 active; 2 placebo}    2.5   mg 
SAD- 4 {6 active; 2 placebo}    5      mg 
SAD-5 {6 active; 2 placebo}   10     mg 
SAD-6 {6 active; 2 placebo}   20     mg 
SAD-7 {6 active; 2 placebo}   40     mg 
SAD-8 
 
{6 active; 2 placebo} 100     mg, the 
human equivalent 
of NOAEL in rats 
SAD-9 
Not done 
{6 active; 2 placebo} 150     mg, 
maximally 
 
 
 
Not done 
SAD-10 
Not done 
{6 active; 2 placebo} 225     mg, 
maximally 
SAD-11 
Not done 
{6 active; 2 placebo} 337     mg, 
maximally 
SAD-12 
Not done 
{6 active; 2 placebo} 505     mg, 
maximally  
Food Interaction (FI) Cohort 
FI-cohort 
Begun on 
12th 
September 
2015 
12 healthy volunteers:  
Study-day & condition 
(fasted/not fasted) were 
confounded. 
Not pre-specified 
In practice, dosed 
at  40 mg on each 
of two study-days 
 
None reported as far as 
we know 
Multiple Ascending Dose (MAD) Cohorts with daily dosing for 10 days: 4 MAD 
cohorts but with conditional approval for 4 more [9]  . . .  
Pharmacokinetic (PK) PRECAUTION: Protocol stated that the dose levels for the 
first four MAD cohorts would be determined “after the evaluation of safety, 
tolerability and available PK results of previous SAD and MAD (when applicable) 
dose groups”. 
MAD-1 
Begun on 6th 
October 2015 
{6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified 
but     2.5 mg  
 
None reported as far as 
we know 
MAD-2 {6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified 
but     5    mg  
MAD-3 {6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified Volunteer 2305, who 
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Begun on 17th 
November 
2015 
but   10    mg  received BIA 10-2474 had 
blurred vision twice, also 
headache by press-
account, and subsequently 
had cerebral vascular 
accident diagnosed by 
MRI. Another volunteer 
had blurred vision twice. 
MAD-4 {6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified 
but   20   mg  
One or two volunteers 
each had headache twice. 
 
The ANSM-approved protocol [9] stated that, if the maximum tolerated dose was not 
reached after completing the fourth MAD cohort, up to 4 additional MAD cohorts 
could be added. 
MAD-5 
Begun on 6th 
January 
2016.  
 
 
Suspended on 
11th January 
2016 after the 
remaining 
seven 
volunteers 
had received 
their Day 6 
dose. 
{6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified 
but   50   mg  
Onset of neurological 
symptoms, including 
diplopia and headache, in 
volunteer 2508 after 
dosing on Day 5. This 
volunteer was hospitalized 
in the evening of 10th 
January 2016, became 
comatose in the morning 
of 11th and died on 17th 
January 2016. 
 
Four other volunteers who 
each received a sixth 50 
mg dose of BIA 10-2474 
became symptomatic and 
were hospitalized. The 
fifth was not symptomatic 
but was hospitalized as a 
precaution [8]. 
MAD-6 
Not done 
{6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified  
 
Not done MAD-7 
Not done 
{6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified 
MAD-8 
Not done 
{6 active; 2 placebo} Not pre-specified 
Pharmacodynamic study on 20 healthy volunteers: Not done 
 498 
